Earnings management following duality-creating successions: Ethnostatistics, impression management, and agency theory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Davidson, WN III; Jiraporn, P; Kim, YS; Nemec, C
• 署名单位: Southern Illinois University System; Southern Illinois University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M International University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/20159577
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 267-275
• 关键词: EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION; performance; BOARD; antecedents

摘要

We explore impression and earnings management via reasoning and methods grounded in ethnostatistics and agency theory. We hypothesized that earnings management occurs more frequently following duality-creating successions than otherwise because CEO-chairs have greater control of the impressions created by their firms' financial reports and are operating under greater expectations of positive results. Using a sample of 173 duality-creating succession announcements and 112 non-duality-creating succession announcements, we obtained empirical results consistent with these predictions.