INSIDER TRADING IN FINANCIAL SIGNALING MODELS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BAGNOLI, M; KHANNA, N
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.2307/2329001
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 1905-1934
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; capital structure; announcements; OFFERINGS; COSTS

摘要

We study the impact of voluntary trade by the manager. We find that, in contrast to standard signaling models, an action is good news for some firms and bad news for others, depending on observable characteristics of the firm, its managers, and their compensation plans. Further, voluntary trade eliminates separating equilibria and thus the possibility of exactly inferring the manager's private information. This may cause the manager to take inefficient actions so as to earn trading profits. Such undesirable behavior can be more effectively constrained by compensation contracts based on phantom shares or nontradeable options instead of large stockholdings.