MANAGERS TRADING AROUND STOCK REPURCHASES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: LEE, DS; MIKKELSON, WH; PARTCH, MM
• 署名单位: University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.2307/2329003
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 1947-1961
• 关键词: TENDER OFFERS; information-content; corporate-control; MARKET; announcements; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover-related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.