CEO tenure and company invention under differing levels of technological dynamism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, SB; Levitas, E; Priem, RL
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/20159702
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 859-873
• 关键词: research-and-development; ORGANIZATION; strategy; FIRMS; performance; INNOVATION; OWNERSHIP; networks; patents

摘要

Following from research on firms' upper echelons, this article examines the previously unstudied issue of how technological dynamism moderates the relationship between a CEO's time in office and company inventive activities. We evaluate this relationship in the biopharmaceutical industry, a technology- and invention-intensive context. As would be expected from notions of a CEO life cycle, our results indicate a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped overall relationship between CEO tenure and invention. But technological dynamism shifts this curve in such a way that short-tenured CEOs engender more invention under highly dynamic technological environments, while long-tenured CEOs spur greater invention under more stable technologies.