When exploration backfires: Unintended consequences of multilevel organizational search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Siggelkow, Nicolaj; Rivkin, Jan W.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2006.22083053
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 779-795
• 关键词: model; performance; decentralization; determinants; exploitation; TECHNOLOGY; INNOVATION; EVOLUTION

摘要

An enduring belief is that unleashing low-level members of an organization to explore extensively will broaden the exploration conducted by the entire organization. Using an agent-based simulation model, we show that in multilevel organizations, increased exploration at lower levels can backfire, reducing overall exploration and diminishing performance in environments that require broad search. This result arises when interdependencies cut across the domains of low-level managers. With no cross-departmental interdependencies, more extensive low-level exploration can improve firm performance. Our findings show that careful attention to information processing in multilevel organizations can shed light on whether, and when, decentralization encourages innovation.