CORPORATE-CONTROL, PORTFOLIO CHOICE, AND THE DECLINE OF BANKING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: GORTON, G; ROSEN, R
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05183.x
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 1377-1420
• 关键词: LOCALLY WEIGHTED REGRESSION; Deposit insurance; Ownership structure; empirical-analysis; MARKET; RISK; MODEL; intermediation; SHAREHOLDERS; valuation

摘要

In the 1980s, U.S. banks became systematically less profitable and riskier as non-bank competition eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures rose exponentially during this decade. The leading explanation for the persistence of these trends centers on fixed-rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank equity holders an incentive to take on risk when the value of bank charters falls. We propose and test an alternative explanation based on corporate control considerations. We show that managerial entrenchment played a more important role than did the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance in explaining the recent behavior of the banking industry.