Capabilities, contractual hazards, and governance: Integrating resource-based and transaction cost perspectives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mayer, Kyle J.; Salomon, Robert M.
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; New York University; New York University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 942-959
• 关键词: firm; KNOWLEDGE; view; performance; BOUNDARIES; capacity; strategy; MARKET; logit

摘要

We address independent and joint effects of contractual hazards and technological capabilities on governance, arguing that strong technological capabilities improve a firm's ability to govern transactions, making outsourcing feasible despite certain contractual hazards. Examining a random sample of 405 service contracts from a single information technology firm, we found that contractual hazards encouraged internalizing transactions. Weak technological capabilities increased the likelihood of subcontracting, but strong technological capabilities had no independent effect. The latter had impact only in the presence of certain contractual hazards. These results illuminate why firms facing similar levels of contracting hazards organize their transactions differently.