Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stein, JC
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.2307/2329558
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 111-133
• 关键词: firm performance; tobin-q; acquisitions; tournaments; CONTRACTS; benefits; focus

摘要

This article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market. Unlike a bank, headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in ''winner-picking''-the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another. By doing a good job in the winner-picking dimension, headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm-wide credit constraints. The model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects.