CEO contracting and antitakeover amendments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Borokhovich, KA; Brunarski, KR; Parrino, R
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.2307/2329444
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 1495-1517
• 关键词: investment opportunity set; Ownership structure; SHARK REPELLENTS; compensation policies; CHARTER AMENDMENTS; Managerial myopia; BOARD COMPOSITION; stock-prices; WEALTH; performance

摘要

This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.