Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berger, PG; Ofek, E; Yermack, DL
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.2307/2329441
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 1411-1438
• 关键词: corporate-control; FINANCING POLICIES; market valuation; Agency problems; DISCRETION; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; options; plans; COSTS

摘要

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.