Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder intervention

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kahn, C; Winton, A
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.45483
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 99-129
• 关键词: market liquidity; EFFICIENCY

摘要

An institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading (speculation) and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance. Intervention increases the value of the institution's existing shareholdings, but intervention only increases the institution's trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution's information relative to that of uninformed traders. Thus, the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention. We examine key factors that affect the intervention decision, the usefulness of short-swing provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention, and implications for ownership structure across different firms.