Dividends, asymmetric information, and agency conflicts: Evidence from a comparison of the dividend policies of Japanese and US firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dewenter, KL; Warther, VA
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00038
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 879-904
• 关键词: Financial distress; corporate-finance; UNITED-STATES; stock-prices; announcements; INITIATIONS; performance; INVESTMENT; OMISSIONS; OWNERSHIP

摘要

We compare dividend policies of U.S. and Japanese firms, partitioning the Japanese data into keiretsu, independent, and hybrid firms. We examine the correlation between dividend changes and stock returns, and the reluctance to change dividends. Results are consistent with the joint hypotheses that Japanese firms, particularly keiretsu-member firms, face less information asymmetry and fewer agency conflicts than U.S. firms, and that information asymmetries and/or agency conflicts affect dividend policy. Japanese firms experience smaller stock price reactions to dividend omissions and initiations, they are less reluctant to omit and cut dividends, and their dividends are more responsive to earnings changes.