Blocks, liquidity, and corporate control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bolton, P; von Thadden, EL
• 署名单位: Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Tilburg University; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.15240
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 1-25
• 关键词: Ownership concentration; Market equilibrium; Firm value; INFORMATION; volatility; investor; prices

摘要

The paper develops a simple model of corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analyzed. The model compares the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the benefits from efficient management control achieved by some degree of ownership concentration. The paper reexamines the free-rider problem in corporate control in the presence of liquidity trading, derives predictions for the trade and pricing of blocks, and provides criteria for the optimal choice of ownership structure.