Banks and corporate control in Japan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morck, R; Nakamura, M
• 署名单位: University of Alberta; University of British Columbia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00106
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 319-339
• 关键词: firm performance; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Using a large sample of Japanese firm level data, we find that Japanese banks act primarily in the short term interests of creditors when dealing with firms outside bank groups. Corporate control mechanisms other than bank oversight appear necessary in these firms. When dealing with firms in bank groups, banks may act in the broader interests of a range of stakeholders, including shareholders. However, our findings are also consistent with banks propping up troubled bank group firms. We conclude that bank oversight need not lead to value maximizing corporate governance.