CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shivdasani, A; Yermack, D
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00168
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 1829-1853
• 关键词: SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; Ownership structure; corporate-control; DIRECTORS; MARKET; determinants; performance; governance; Managers; turnover

摘要

We study whether CEO involvement in the selection of new directors influences the nature of appointments to the board. When the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of interest; Stock price reactions to independent director appointments are significantly lower when the CEO is involved in director selection. Our evidence may illuminate a mechanism used by CEOs to reduce pressure from active monitoring, and we find a recent trend of companies removing CEOs from involvement in director selection.