CAVEAT VENDITOR: TRUST ASYMMETRIES IN ACQUISITIONS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: Graebner, Melissa E.
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2009.41330413
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 435-472
• 关键词: CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS; RETROSPECTIVE REPORTS; procedural justice; transaction costs; joint ventures; INTERNET FIRMS; Real options; TECHNOLOGY; COOPERATION; MARKET

摘要

I explore the role of trust in acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms, taking a dyadic view that gives equal attention to buyers and sellers. The two parties have asymmetric views regarding whether their counterparts are trustworthy. I outline how these asymmetries emerge, persist, and influence behavior, including tendencies to behave deceptively and to guard against deception, I also find that buyers' and sellers' beliefs concerning whether their counterparts are trustworthy and trusting are often erroneous. I explore the implications of these findings for developing a theory of trust asymmetries and argue that selecting buyers on the basis of trust increases rather than diminishes entrepreneurs' vulnerability.