INNOVATIVE KNOWLEDGE ASSETS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE ASYMMETRIC ROLES OF INCENTIVES AND MONITORING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Jinyu; Wang, Heli C.
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2009.44633414
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 919-938
• 关键词: RESOURCE-BASED VIEW; CEO STOCK-OPTIONS; Competitive advantage; financial performance; institutional investors; executive-compensation; managerial incentives; corporate governance; firm performance; AGENCY COSTS

摘要

We posit that a firm's resource configuration constitutes a critical context for various corporate governance mechanisms. Although innovative knowledge assets are generally a key determinant of a firm's economic performance, they also lead to greater information asymmetry among managers and owners and to the need to grant managers more discretion in making resource deployment decisions. This weakens the role of monitoring but increases the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. Therefore, we hypothesize asymmetric moderating effects of monitoring- and incentive-based governance mechanisms on the relationship between innovative knowledge assets and economic performance. Our empirical analyses provide support for the key arguments.