Corporate ownership around the world

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: La Porta, R; Lopez-de-Silanes, F; Shleifer, A
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00115
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 471-517
• 关键词: VOTING-RIGHTS; large shareholders; governance; MARKET; STOCK; firm; COSTS; JAPAN

摘要

We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash Flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.