The financing and redeployment of specific assets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Habib, MA; Johnsen, DB
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; George Mason University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00122
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 693-720
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; DEBT CONTRACTS; AGENCY COSTS; Trade credit; POLICY; firm; RENEGOTIATION; determinants; investments; integration

摘要

We model the role various forms of nonrecourse secured debt play in efficiently redeploying assets whose value is state-specific. Ex ante, an entrepreneur and an asset redeployer make noncontractible state-specific investments in the primary and next-best uses of an asset, respectively. The redeployer provides a secured nonrecourse loan equal to the value of the asset in the critical state that separates the good and bad states. In the event of a bad state, this contract averts ex post bargaining over the asset's quasi-rents on redeployment and leaves the parties' ex ante investments undistorted.