Capital structure and corporate control: The effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garvey, GT; Hanka, G
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00116
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 519-546
• 关键词: Managerial entrenchment; FINANCING POLICIES; MARKET; management; debt; DISCRETION; decisions; POISON; EXIT

摘要

We find that firms protected by second generation state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.