Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schwert, GW
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00301
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 2599-2640
• 关键词: VOTING-RIGHTS; corporate; performance; MARKET; targets; mergers

摘要

This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinction in both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers result from replacing incumbent managers and gains from friendly takeovers result from strategic synergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect strategic choices made by the bidder or the target. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, except that hostile transactions involve publicity as part of the bargaining process.