THE IMPACT OF TMT BOARD MEMBER CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENT ON POST-IPO PERFORMANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Walters, Bruce A.; Kroll, Mark; Wright, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Louisiana System; Louisiana Technical University; University of Louisiana System; Louisiana Technical University; University of Memphis
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.51468968
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 572-595
• 关键词: initial public offerings; long-run performance; CEO STOCK-OPTIONS; corporate boards; ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS; executive-compensation; STRATEGIC PERSISTENCE; firm performance; FOUNDER STATUS; risk-taking

摘要

We draw on theories of entrepreneurial firms to explore the impact of top management team (TMT) board control on holding period returns (HPRs). We posit a complex relation between a firm's performance after initial public offering (IPO) and the proportion of TMT members on its board. HPRs increased modestly as TMT board membership rose to 50 percent, increased dramatically as it rose from 50 to 75 percent (the optimal range), and decreased materially as it rose beyond 75 percent. Further, environmental conditions influenced the focal relationship, in some cases in unpredictable ways, even when TMT board control was optimal.