Fund advisor compensation in closed-end funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coles, JL; Suay, J; Woodbury, D
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Arizona; Brigham Young University; Brigham Young University - Hawaii
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00251
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 1385-1414
• 关键词: INVESTMENT COMPANIES; information-content; Abnormal returns; moral hazard; performance; discounts; principal; CONTRACTS; incentives; OWNERSHIP

摘要

This paper examines the relation between the premium on closed-end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisors, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. We find that the fund premium is larger when: (a) the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance; (b) the assets managed by the advisor are concentrated in the fund in question; (c) the advisor manages other funds with low compensation sensitivity to performance and with low concentration of assets managed by the advisor; and (d) the advisor's compensation contract evaluates performance relative to a benchmark.