Agency problems and dividend policies around the world

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: La Porta, R; Lopez-de-Silanes, F; Shleifer, A; Vishny, RW
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00199
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 1-33
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; corporate-finance; capital structure; GROWTH; taxes; debt; japanese; WEALTH; COSTS; firm

摘要

This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the outcome model, dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the substitute model, insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.