DO SHAREHOLDERS OR STAKEHOLDERS APPROPRIATE THE RENTS FROM CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION? THE INFLUENCE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: David, Parthiban; O'Brien, Jonathan P.; Yoshikawa, Toru; Delios, Andrew
• 署名单位: American University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; McMaster University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.51469005
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 636-654
• 关键词: free cash flow; International diversification; firm performance; institutional investors; CAPITAL-INVESTMENT; ceo compensation; AGENCY COSTS; japanese; governance; product

摘要

Prior work on the performance consequences of corporate diversification has treated all powerful owners as seeking the same benefits from diversification (i.e, higher profit rather than growth) and therefore limiting value appropriation by other stakeholders such as employees and managers. In contrast, we distinguish between domestic relational owners and foreign transactional owners in Japanese corporations. Although transactional owners do indeed prioritize profitability when diversifying, relational owners primarily seek growth rather than profits from diversification. Furthermore, relational owners also allow managers and employees to appropriate more of the rents arising from diversification than do transactional owners.