EARNINGS PRESSURE AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM THE US ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Yu; Gimeno, Javier
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.52814593
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 743-768
• 关键词: agency costs; institutional investors; SECURITIES ANALYSTS; empirical-analysis; PRICING BEHAVIOR; Excess capacity; career concerns; market power; management; INVESTMENT

摘要

This study examines the effect of pressure felt by management to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts on firms' behavior in oligopolistic output competition. We argue that firms under such earnings pressure strive to increase current profits by exploiting market power opportunities and tightening output, even though these acts could encourage rival output expansion. Using data from the U.S. electricity generation industry, we found that firms facing earnings pressure tended to restrict output in markets in which market structure and competitor characteristics were favorable for the exercise of market power, but their competitors tended to increase output in those markets.