AGENCY THEORY REVISITED: CEO RETURN AND SHAREHOLDER INTEREST ALIGNMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nyberg, Anthony J.; Fulmer, Ingrid Smithey; Gerhart, Barry; Carpenter, Mason A.
• 署名单位: University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2010.54533188
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1029-1049
• 关键词: executive-compensation; firm performance; managerial incentives; corporate performance; ACCOUNTING EARNINGS; MODERATING ROLE; pay; management; RISK; OWNERSHIP

摘要

Agency theory suggests that managerial mischief may occur when the interests of owners and managers diverge and that a solution to this agency problem is alignment of owner and agent interests through agent compensation and equity ownership. We develop the theoretical concept of CEO return and measure and estimate financial alignment as the relationship between CEO and shareholder returns. Our results, based on this new conceptualization and corresponding measurement, suggest stronger alignment than reported in previous work. The magnitude of this alignment is associated with subsequent firm performance, but in ways not clearly articulated or tested in prior research.