Bookbuilding and strategic allocation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cornelli, F; Goldreich, D
署名单位：
Duke University; University of London; London Business School
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-1082
DOI：
10.1111/0022-1082.00407
发表日期：
2001
页码：
2337-2369
关键词：
摘要：
In the bookbuilding procedure, an investment banker solicits bids for shares from institutional investors prior to pricing an equity issue. The banker then prices the issue and allocates shares at his discretion to the investors. We examine the books for 39 international equity issues. We find that the investment banker awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids. Regular investors receive favorable allocations, especially when the issue is heavily oversubscribed. The investment banker also favors revised bids and domestic investors.
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