Why do money fund managers voluntarily waive their fees?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Christoffersen, SEK
• 署名单位: McGill University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00358
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1117-1140
• 关键词: industry; performance; incentives; MODEL

摘要

Over half of money fund managers Voluntarily waive fees they have a contractual right to claim. Moreover, as a consequence of fee waivers, funds on average collect one half of reported expense ratios. Variation in fee waivers is significant and relates to differences in relative performance. Both low-performing retail and institutional funds waive fees to improve their net performance. More interestingly, high-performing retail, but not institutional, funds use fee waivers to strategically adjust net performance to increase expected fund flows. Despite fund flow incentives, high-performing institutional funds do not waive more because they cannot significantly improve their relative performance.