Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? Market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Peria, MSM; Schmukler, SL
• 署名单位: The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00354
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1029-1051
• 关键词: risk; debt

摘要

This paper empirically investigates two issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. We evaluate the interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline. We focus on the experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.