Economic distress, financial distress, and dynamic liquidation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kahl, M
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00418
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 135-168
• 关键词: capital structure; debt; bankruptcy; reorganization; transactions; investors; MARKET; COSTS

摘要

Many firms emerging from a debt restructuring remain highly leveraged, continue to invest little, perform poorly, and often reenter financial distress. The existing literature interprets these findings as inefficiencies arising from coordination problems among many creditors or an inefficient design of bankruptcy law. In contrast, this paper emphasizes that creditors lack the information that is needed to make quick and correct liquidation decisions. It can explain the long-term nature of financial distress solely as the result of dynamic learning strategies of creditors and suggests that it may be an unavoidable byproduct of an efficient resolution of financial distress.