DO CEOS ENCOUNTER WITHIN-TENURE SETTLING UP? A MULTIPERIOD PERSPECTIVE ON EXECUTIVE PAY AND DISMISSAL

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wowak, Adam J.; Hambrick, Donald C.; Henderson, Andrew D.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/AMJ.2011.64869961
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 719-739
• 关键词: TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION; firm performance; managerial incentives; corporate performance; Agency theory; OWNERSHIP; turnover; RISK; MARKET; DIRECTORS

摘要

We consider a central puzzle surrounding CEO accountability: What explains the payoffs and penalties that CEOs receive? Invoking Fama's concept of settling up, we examine how a CEO's entire performance record and history of prior over- or underpayment affect current pay and the odds of dismissal. We find that some parts of a CEO's historical track record work to remedy prior over- or underpayment, whereas other aspects result in greater imbalances, as rich CEOs get richer while poorer ones get poorer. History matters when boards reward or punish their CEOs, but such reckoning is relatively complex.