Takeover defenses of IPO firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Field, LC; Karpoff, JM
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00482
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1857-1889
• 关键词: initial public offerings; POISON PILL SECURITIES; operating performance; Ownership structure; DIRECTORS; WEALTH; valuation; companies; Managers

摘要

Many firms deploy takeover defenses when they go public. IPO managers tend to deploy defenses when their compensation is high, shareholdings are small, and oversight from nonmanagerial shareholders is weak. The presence of a defense is negatively related to subsequent acquisition likelihood, yet has no impact on takeover premiums for firms that are acquired. These results do not support arguments that takeover defenses facilitate the eventual sale of IPO firms at high takeover premiums. Rather, they suggest that managers shift the cost of takeover protection onto nonmanagerial shareholders. Thus, agency problems are important even for firms at the IPO stage.