New evidence on the market for directors: Board membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coles, JL; Hoi, CK
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Rochester Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00522
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 197-230
• 关键词: TOP MANAGEMENT CHANGES; performance; turnover; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; banks; CEOS

摘要

We examine the relation between a boards decision to reject antitakeover provisions of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310 and subsequent labor market opportunities of those same board members. Compared to directors retaining all provisions, directors rejecting all protective provisions of SB1310 are three times as likely to gain additional external directorships and are 30 percent more likely to retain their internal slot on the board of that same Pennsylvania company. For external board seats, the results are driven by nonexecutive directors who are not members of the management team; for internal board seats, the results are driven by executive directors.