Family firms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burkart, M; Panunzi, F; Shleifer, A
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics; University of Bologna; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00601
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 2167-2201
• 关键词: investor protection; corporate-ownership; large shareholders; AGENCY COSTS

摘要

We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.