APPRENTICE, DEPARTURE, AND DEMOTION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE THREE TYPES OF CEO-BOARD CHAIR SEPARATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krause, Ryan; Semadeni, Matthew
• 署名单位: Texas Christian University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2011.0121
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 805-826
• 关键词: Agency theory; STRATEGY RESEARCH; firm performance; Duality; succession; governance; management; DIRECTORS; IMPACT; INDEPENDENCE

摘要

Past research has consistently shown that separation of CEO and board chair roles has no systematic effect on firm performance. In this study, we introduce the different forms of such separation: apprentice, departure, and demotion. In a study of Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 and Fortune 1000 firms, we find that separation of the two leadership roles positively impacts future firm performance when current performance is poor, but negatively impacts future firm performance when current performance is high. We find that this effect is most dramatic for demotion separations. Finally, we test theory about the permanency of CEO-board chair separation. Our results show that the different types of CEO-board chair separation have very distinct consequences.