Competition and coalition among underwriters: The decision to join a syndicate

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Song, WL
• 署名单位: Drexel University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00704.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2421-2444
• 关键词: CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST; Glass-Steagall Act; COMMERCIAL-BANKS; securities; INFORMATION; debt; reputation; QUALITY; MARKET; issues

摘要

This paper studies the decision of lead investment banks to organize hybrid syndicates (commercial banks participating as co-managers) versus pure investment bank syndicates. The findings show that hybrid underwriting issues are more challenging to float. Compared to pure investment bank syndicates, hybrid syndicates serve clients that are smaller, have lower common stock rankings and less prior access to the capital markets, rely more on bank loans, and invest less capital but issue larger amounts, which indicates that commercial banks' participation enhances hybrid services. Moreover, lead investment banks tend to invite banks' participation when clients exhibit higher loyalty in reusing their services.