The nature of discipline by corporate takeovers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kini, O; Kracaw, W; Mian, S
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Emory University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00671.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1511-1552
• 关键词: ownership structure; HOSTILE TAKEOVERS; market valuation; management; governance; DIRECTORS; turnover; WEALTH; 1980S

摘要

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the disciplinary role of the corporate takeover market using a sample of US. target firms over the period 1979 to 1998. The time period spanned allows a broader study not only of the disciplinary role of the takeover market in general, but also of the interaction between the takeover market and alternative governance mechanisms during the 1980s and 1990s. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the view of the corporate takeover market as a court of last resort, that is, it is an external source of discipline that intercedes when internal control mechanisms are relatively weak or ineffective.