Characteristics, contracts, and actions:: Evidence from venture capitalist analyses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kaplan, SN; Strömberg, P
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00696.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2177-2210
• 关键词: incentive contracts; trade-off; investments; RISK; debt; COMPENSATION; performance; syndication; governance; securities

摘要

We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs describe the strengths and risks of the investments as well as expected postinvestment actions. We classify the risks into three categories and relate them to the allocation of cash flow rights, contingencies, control rights, and liquidation rights between VCs and entrepreneurs. The risk results suggest that agency and hold-up problems are important to contract design and monitoring, but that risk sharing is not. Greater VC control is associated with increased management intervention, while greater VC equity incentives are associated with increased value-added support.