Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yermack, D
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2281-2308
• 关键词: performance; determinants; COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP; CEOS; WEALTH

摘要

I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these relations to apply under limited circumstances such as financial distress. Together these incentive mechanisms provide directors with wealth increases of approximately 11 cents per $1,000 rise in firm value. Although smaller than the performance sensitivities of CEOs, outside directors' incentives imply a change in wealth of about $285,000 for a 1 standard deviation (SD) change in typical firm performance. Cross-sectional patterns of director equity awards conform to agency and financial theories.