Monitoring as a motivation for IPO underpricing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arugaslan, O; Cook, DO; Kieschnick, R
• 署名单位: Western Michigan University; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00703.x
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 2403-2420
• 关键词: initial public offerings; PRICE STABILIZATION; OWNERSHIP; issues; MARKET

摘要

Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) provide contrasting arguments for why monitoring considerations create incentives for managers to underprice their firms' IPOs (initial public offerings). Like Smart and Zutter (2003), we examine these arguments using a sample of U.S. IPOs. However, we find evidence that the determinants of initial returns, institutional shareholdings, and post-IPO likelihood of acquisition are not consistent with these arguments. Thus, we conclude that monitoring considerations are not important determinants of IPO underpricing.