Managers, workers, and corporate control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pagano, M; Volpin, PF
• 署名单位: University of Naples Federico II; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 841-868
• 关键词: STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS; takeover; governance; WEALTH; LABOR; firm

摘要

If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a shark repellent through long-term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as white squires for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.