Governance mechanisms and equity prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cremers, KJM; Nair, VB
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.x
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 2859-2894
• 关键词: PENSION FUND ACTIVISM; corporate governance; turnover; MARKET; performance; PROTECTION; takeovers; returns; boards; RISK

摘要

We investigate how the market for corporate control (external governance) and shareholder activism (internal governance) interact. A portfolio that buys firms with the highest level of takeover vulnerability and shorts firms with the lowest level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized abnormal return of 10% to 15% only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. A similar portfolio created to capture the importance of internal governance generates annualized abnormal returns of 8%, though only in the presence of high vulnerability to takeovers. The complementarity effect exists for firms with lower industry-adjusted leverage and is stronger for smaller firms.