COMPETITIVE PARITY, STATUS DISPARITY, AND MUTUAL FORBEARANCE: SECURITIES ANALYSTS' COMPETITION FOR INVESTOR ATTENTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bowers, Anne H.; Greve, Henrich R.; Mitsuhashi, Hitoshi; Baum, Joel A. C.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; INSEAD Business School; Keio University
• 刊物名称: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4273
• DOI: 10.5465/amj.2011.0818
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 38-62
• 关键词: regulation fair disclosure; CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST; multimarket contact; career concerns; MARKET; DYNAMICS; POWER; recommendations; uncertainty; INFORMATION

摘要

Most studies of responses to change in competitive environments focus on competitor-specific adaptations. However, rivals are often acutely aware of one another, and this awareness should influence their competitive behavior. In this study, we focus on three market structures that affect competitive behavior: competitive parity, status disparity, and multipoint contact. In particular, we examine how securities analysts responded to a regulatory discontinuity, Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg-FD), which promotes competitive parity by eliminating privileged access to proprietary firm information as a critical source of competitive advantage. We predict and find that Reg-FD activated mutual forbearance among analysts linked through multipoint contact. We also predict and find that high-status analysts forbear more strongly. Analysts' responses to heterogeneity in competitive advantage thus depend importantly on their competitive overlap and status, which has implications for both their behavior and the information they provide to investors.