Lending booms and lending standards

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni; Marquez, Robert
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01065.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 2511-2546
• 关键词: Adverse selection; insurance markets; banking; COMPETITION; INFORMATION; equilibrium; STABILITY; SYSTEM; entry; games

摘要

We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.