When financial institutions are large shareholders: The role of macro corporate governance environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Donghui; Moshirian, Fariborz; Pham, Peter Kien; Zein, Jason
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01009.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 2975-3007
• 关键词: ownership structure; investor; determines; liquidity; Activism

摘要

While financial institutions' aggregate investments have grown substantially worldwide, the size of their individual shareholdings, and ultimately their incentive to monitor, may be limited by the free-rider problem, regulations, and a preference for diversification and liquidity. We compare institutions' shareholding patterns across countries and find vast differences in the extent to which they are large shareholders. These variations are largely determined by macro corporate governance factors such as shareholder protection, law enforcement, and corporate disclosure requirements. This suggests that strong governance environments act to strengthen monitoring ability such that more institutions are encouraged to hold concentrated equity positions.