A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Almeida, Heitor V.; Wolfenzon, Daniel
• 署名单位: New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01001.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 2637-2680
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; Investor protection; Emerging markets; Firm value; IMPACT; COSTS

摘要

We provide a new rationale for pyramidal ownership in family business groups. A pyramid allows a family to access all retained earnings of a firm it already controls to set up a new firm, and to share the new firm's nondiverted payoff with shareholders of the original firm. Our model is consistent with recent evidence of a small separation between ownership and control in some pyramids, and can differentiate between pyramids and dual-class shares, even when either method can achieve the same deviation from one share-one vote. Other predictions of the model are consistent with both systematic and anecdotal evidence.