Which investors fear expropriation? Evidence from investors' portfolio choices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Giannetti, Mariassunta; Simonov, Andrei
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00879.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 1507-1547
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; private benefits; OWNERSHIP; PROTECTION; performance; prices

摘要

Using a data set that provides unprecedented detail on investors' stockholdings, we analyze whether investors take the quality of corporate governance into account when selecting stocks. We find that all categories of investors (domestic and foreign, institutional and small individual) who generally enjoy only security benefits are reluctant to invest in companies with weak corporate governance. In contrast, individuals connected with company insiders are more likely to invest in weak corporate governance companies. These findings suggest that it is important to distinguish between investors who enjoy private benefits or access private information, and investors who enjoy only security benefits.