Political connections and corporate bailouts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Faccio, Mara; Masulis, Ronald W.; McConnell, John J.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 2597-2635
• 关键词: financial development; Government ownership; GROWTH

摘要

We analyze the likelihood of government bailouts of 450 politically connected firms from 35 countries during 1997-2002. Politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out than similar nonconnected firms. Additionally, politically connected firms are disproportionately more likely to be bailed out when the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank provides financial assistance to the firm's home government. Further, among bailed-out firms, those that are politically connected exhibit significantly worse financial performance than their nonconnected peers at the time of and following the bailout. This evidence suggests that, at least in some countries, political connections influence the allocation of capital through the mechanism of financial assistance when connected companies confront economic distress.