Bank mergers and crime: The real and social effects of credit market competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garmaise, MJ; Moskowitz, TJ
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00847.x
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 495-538
• 关键词: financial dependence; INEQUALITY; GROWTH; consolidation; CONSEQUENCES; unemployment; industry; rates; size

摘要

Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide micro-level (within-county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experience more bank mergers are subject to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger-induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition.